Human rights, property and the recovery of medical costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill in the Supreme Court by McCarthy, Frankie
Human rights, property and the Recovery of Medical Costs for 
Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill in the Supreme Court 
Frankie McCarthy* 
 
The Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill was referred to the Supreme Court 
by the Counsel General for Wales for a determination of its legislative competence.1 Two potential 
issues arose: first, whether the Bill purported to legislate on matters which had not been devolved to 
the Welsh Assembly; and second, whether it contravened Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (A1P1). The court was unanimous in determining that the 
Bill was incompetent on both grounds, although the minority (Lord Thomas and Lady Hale) reached 
that conclusion on considerably narrower grounds that the majority (Lords Mance, Hodge and 
Neuberger.) The decision has relevance for the proposed Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos 
Diseases (Scotland) Bill, in respect of which the initial consultation closed shortly after this judgment 
was handed down.2 This note summarises the findings of the Supreme Court, before discussing the 
A1P1 implications of the decision for the potential Scottish Bill.  
 
A: THE WELSH BILL 
 
Where a person in the UK pays compensation in respect of physical or psychological injury to 
another, they also become liable for NHS charges in relation to the treatment of that injury.3 The Bill 
proposed creation of a similar liability in respect of Welsh NHS charges for treatment of asbestos-
related diseases. Section 2 sought to impose liability on any person who paid compensation for an 
asbestos-related disease. Such “compensators” would typically be employers who had negligently 
exposed the sufferer to asbestos during his working life. Section 14 proposed that where the payment 
made by a compensator was covered by an insurance policy, the policy was to be treated as covering 
liability for NHS charges. This would have applied to policies issued both before and after the section 
came into force. 
In the judgment, the majority interpreted the legal effect of these provisions somewhat 
differently from the minority. The majority view, set out by Lord Mance, was that the Bill would 
impose a new quasi-tortious statutory duty of care on compensators, together with a new contractual 
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liability on the insurers of those compensators.4 The minority view set out by Lord Thomas 
considered that, since the cost of medical care is an established head of recovery in a compensation 
claim, the Bill imposed no new liability on compensators. Rather, it removed the benefit formerly 
enjoyed by compensators of that cost being met by the state – a benefit that compensators could have 
had no legitimate expectation would continue. The “machinery” for the collection of these costs 
placed responsibility directly on compensators, rather than on those in receipt of treatment who might 
then recover the costs from compensators, in order to maximise efficiency and minimise stress for 
sufferers.5 The same result obtained for insurers to the extent that they would always have been liable 
to indemnify costs arising under this head of recovery. However, the Bill proposed that insurers be 
made liable for the full value of NHS charges, without regard to the fact that an insurance policy 
would usually restrict liability by way of deductibles and a policy limit. To the extent that these 
restrictions were ignored by the Bill, the minority accepted that a new contractual duty was being 
placed on insurers.6 
These differences in conceptualisation of the effect of the Bill are essential to an 
understanding of the findings of the Court.    
 
B: COMPETENCE UNDER GOWA, ss108(4) AND (5) 
 
The Government of Wales Act 2006, ss108 and 109, read with sch 7, circumscribe the matters on 
which the Welsh Assembly may competently legislate. The relevant matter for the purposes of the 
Bill is the “organisation and funding of national health service.” The majority took the view that, 
although it might be possible to read this phrase as conferring power on the Welsh Assembly to raise 
monies for NHS purposes,7 there would have to be a close connection between the charges applied 
and the service received, as with the case of prescription charges where the recipient of the medication 
was charged for its cost. The link here between increased statutory and contractual duties on 
compensators and insurers and treatment of asbestos-related diseases was too tenuous to fall within 
this definition, particularly when the Bill did not provide for any funds raised to be hypothecated to 
related treatment services.8 On that basis, the Bill fell outside the legislative competence of the 
Assembly. 
The minority were more firmly of view that the Assembly had competence to enact 
legislation which makes provision for NHS treatment charges for asbestos-related diseases,9 and 
indeed had done so in this case. Rather than imposing charges directly on the sufferer, the 
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“machinery” of the Bill operated to impose them on the compensator, but this could not take the 
provisions beyond the competence of the Assembly.10 The extension of the liability on insurers 
resulting from failure to take account of deductibles and policy limits did, however, exceed the 
powers of the Assembly, since such costs would not already have been recoverable in a compensation 
claim.  To that extent, the minority also found the Bill to fall outside the legislative competence of the 
Assembly.11 
 
C: COMPLIANCE WITH A1P1 
 
Having already determined that the Bill exceeded the legislative competence of the Assembly under 
the first head of argument, it was not necessary for the Court to consider the human rights issue, but 
helpfully it decided to do so nevertheless. A1P1 contains the right to peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions. All five judges accepted that the A1P1 rights of compensators and insurers were engaged 
by the Bill, since their possessions in the form of capital funds would be directly impacted by having 
to make payments in respect of NHS charges. The question then became whether this interference 
with property rights could be justified. Lord Mance identified four stages in the process of review of 
legislative measures which engage A1P1:12  
 
(i) Whether there is a legitimate aim which could justify a restriction of the relevant 
protected right; 
(ii) Whether the measure adopted is rationally connected to that aim; 
(iii) Whether the aim could have been achieved by a less intrusive measure; 
(iv) Whether, on a fair balance, the benefits of achieving the aim by the measure outweigh 
the disbenefits resulting from the restriction of the relevant protected right. 
 
He stressed that the court will accept the legislature’s judgment as to the existence of a 
legitimate aim at stage (i) review, unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation. 
However, this latitude does not extend to stage (iv), where the level of scrutiny required by the Court 
is higher. The question at stage (iv) is whether the measure achieves a fair and proportionate balance 
between the public interest pursued and the private interests affected. Although the views of the 
legislature may still carry significant weight in the balancing exercise, private interests must be given 
similar consideration, and the court may be particularly well placed to evaluate those in the context of 
a particular case.13 
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 An additional concern arose here given the partially retrospective nature of the legislation. 
Although the provisions of the Bill would only apply in respect of compensation payments made after 
its entry into force, those payments related to negligent acts, and insurance policies concluded in 
respect of that negligence, years or decades earlier. In other words, liabilities accrued prior to the 
introduction of the Bill would be expanded by the Bill. Special justification is required for 
retrospectivity in the balancing exercise undertaken at stage (iv). 
The majority focused on stage (iv) of the review process in its decision, ultimately 
determining that a fair balance had not been struck. The Bill would create significant unforeseen and 
unforeseeable new liabilities for compensators and insurers which they had no opportunity to assess, 
rate or make reserves to cover.14 It could also be distinguished from the Damages (Asbestos-related 
Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009, by which the Scottish Parliament provided that pleural plaques, 
plural thickening and asbestosis were actionable wrongs,15 and which was found by the Supreme 
Court to comply with A1P1 in Axa General Insurance Ltd, Petitioners.16 That legislation operated 
primarily to clarify the law, with only a consequential effect on insurers. Additionally, the AXA 
legislation aimed primarily to benefit victims. Here, the primary benefit was to the state. 
Although the minority ultimately agreed that A1P1 had been contravened, it again did so on a 
much narrower basis. Lord Thomas emphasised that the proposed legislation must be viewed in the 
Welsh social and economic context, summarising the particular challenges faced by the Welsh NHS 
given the historical concentration of heavy industry in Wales and the high incidence of occupational 
disease which has resulted.17 The Bill was found to have a legitimate aim in withdrawing from 
negligent employers the benefit of state delivery of treatment services, which was particularly 
necessary given the increasing financial pressure on the Welsh NHS.18 This aim was in the interests of 
social justice as determined by the Welsh legislature. It would not be appropriate for the Court to 
substitute its judgment of social justice from that of the democratically elected Assembly.19 The social 
and economic context was considered to provide the necessary special justification for the 
retrospective elements of the provision.20 The minority also gave greater weight to the social justice 
benefits to be derived from the measure in the balancing exercise, ultimately determining that the Bill 
was proportionate to the extent that employers were affected.21 As before, however, the imposition of 
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new liabilities on insurers which failed to take account of deductibles and policy limits was 
considered disproportionate, meaning the Bill as a whole contravened A1P1.22 
 
D: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED SCOTTISH LEGISLATION 
 
In January 2015, Stuart McMillan MSP proposed the introduction of a Bill making similar provision 
for the recovery of NHS treatment costs for asbestos-related diseases in Scotland. The aim of the 
proposed Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Scotland) Bill would be to:23 
 
Enable Scottish Ministers to recover, from anyone responsible for paying compensation to a 
victim of asbestos-related disease, certain costs incurred by the NHS in Scotland in providing 
care and treatment to that victim.  
 
The consultation paper suggests a Bill written in terms which closely mirror the Welsh 
legilsationproposal, with a direct obligation on compensators to pay NHS charges and a specific 
statutory extension of insurance cover in relation to these costs.  
Given the findings of the Supreme Court outlined above, an A1P1 challenge to any Bill which 
results seems inevitable. Some of the concerns that animated the majority in carrying out the 
balancing exercise – in particular, the very short transitional period proposed prior to the introduction 
of the legislation, which gave insurers little time to adjust – could certainly be ameliorated in 
Scotland. However, so long as any legislation is conceptualised as placing significant new liabilities 
on compensators and insurers, it will be difficult for it to satisfy the proportionality test. The 
alternative interpretation put forward by the minority, although interesting, is hard to see as anything 
other than a back-formation. For all that the Bill could be construed in some sense as removing a 
benefit, the words speak clearly of imposing a liability. Legislation which actually imposed liability 
for NHS charges on sufferers of asbestos-related diseases, even if made subject to the ability of 
sufferers to recover from compensators, would give rise to A1P1 issues of its own, in addition to 
being a deeply unattractive proposition for anyone who values the current model of the NHS as a 
service free at the point of use. 
Of course, sufferers of asbestos-related diseases, along with all other working people in the 
UK, have already paid for NHS treatment through income tax and national insurance. In identifying 
the beneficiary of the Welsh Bill as “the state”, it is perhaps easy to lose sight of the fact that the state 
includes all of us who pay or have paid into the public coffers over the years. A bigger question arises 
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here, particularly in light of the increasing number of A1P1 claims brought by legal persons,24 about 
whether the property right was ever intended to give the same protection to what Michael Robertson 
terms “powerful property” – shortly put, that which gives the owner power over others, as in the case 
of insurance reserves – as to “non-powerful property”, like a house, which is of value principally its 
owner alone.25 Although not an easy question to answer, the current author’s contention is that the 
check placed by the A1P1 rights of the insurance lobby here on the pursuit of the significant social 
justice aims - righting the wrongs done to those negligently exposed to asbestos and funding the NHS 
- cannot be what the drafters of the Convention had in mind when including this particular protection.   
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